I came across this
interesting column today called "12 Things We'd Tell Our
Bosses".  The writer apparently did some sort of survey
of things that folks would like tell their bosses--but that they are
generally hesitant (or afraid) to say.  That raises some red flags: an
organization has to be suffering if there are things that need to be said,
but that aren't being said because folks are afraid of the
repercussions.

As an aside, I'd encourage you to visit our new forum where we
have the makings of an interesting discussion around the pros and cons of
traditional hierarchy vs. self-management; this story is a classic example of
the risk associated with "business as usual".

At any rate, back to my point.  There were a handful of items
in the list that jumped out at me.  Some of the more notable things that
"employees" would tell their "bosses" if they felt safe
doing so:

• Give me the tools I need to do a good job: time, materials,
  information and authority.
• Don't treat me like a cog in a wheel: I'm a
  person!
• Ask for my opinion from time to time: I have some insight and
  would LOVE to have some input!
• I truly need frequent feedback.
• Don't make me work with idiots.

There were some others (hence the title "12 things..."),
but these ones seemed pretty significant to me.  The first three seem to
relate to an individuals desire to have some measure of control over their
life and to do work that's meaningful.  Incidentally, those three were
numbers 1,3 and 4 on the list, respectively.  We talk a lot here at the
SMI about individuals' desire to control their own work, to do work that's
meaningful, and to have some measure of freedom in their jobs--and these are
pretty widely acknowledged ideas.  Most managers, in fact, would
probably agree that their employees want this.  Yet, according to this
article, a substantial number of people wish they could tell their boss that
it's just not happening!  Why is that?

Then we have frequent feedback.  This was number 5 on the
list.  It was interesting to me that respondents to the survey
referenced here said that they would like more feedback.  More
importantly, though, why do employees feel like they can't say this to their
boss without repercussion?  Why would a manager be upset that a
subordinate wanted more feedback?

Finally, one of the more interesting of the 12: Don't make me work
with idiots (number 8 on the list).  I really like this one.  So
many times managers (I speak for myself as a former manager) hire people that
seem to have the know-how to do the job, and stick them in a group without
even asking the rest of the folks within the group what they think.  The
problem is that the person may have the technical expertise to get the job
done, but they're toxic, dishonest or, frankly, just don't abide by the same
set of principles as the rest of the group.

Seems like the self-management principles that we advocate are
designed, in part, to eliminate these issues.  Further, and perhaps more
importantly, they are designed to mitigate the fear of reprisal by a superior
for bringing up something that would enable colleagues to better do their
job.

What do you think?

The keynote at our recent Self-Management Symposium was delivered
in the form of an interview of Professor Isaac Getz of ESCP Europe Business
School and Brian Carney of the Wall Street Journal, co-authors of the book
Freedom,
Inc.  One of the things they discuss in their book is
"managing to the 3%".  They discussed it in the interview and,
as I listened to them speak, it occurred to me that this may well be one of
the most dangerous risks to organizations everywhere.

Let me try to outline the concept:

Getz and Carney discuss, in their book, a particular manufacturing
firm.  The owner happens to be walking through the factory one day and
sees a worker standing at the supply closet, holding a pair of worn
gloves.  The owner stops and asks the employee if there's something he
can help with.  The employee responds that he's waiting for the supply
clerk to come to the supply closet so that he can turn in his worn out gloves
and receive a new pair.  The owner nods and says that's fine, and moves
on.  But he can't shake the feeling that something's not right.  So
he tracks down the factory accountant and asks him how much it costs the
company for a pair of gloves.  I don't recall the exact cost, but it was
a few dollars.  He then asks how much it costs the company for that
particular employee to sit for 15 minutes and wait for a new pair of gloves
(the employee worked on a line that was running at reduced capacity while he
sat and waited for new gloves).  Again, I don't recall the exact amount,
but it was around $100 per 15 minutes.  After mulling this over for a
few minutes, the owner of the company called everyone together and abolished
the "new glove" process.  He indicated that gloves would be
freely available to anyone who needed them.

You see, he realized something very important: their policy, intended to
keep dishonest employees from stealing gloves (or, at the minimum, taking
gloves more frequently than they really needed to) was actually costing the
company money.  He calculated that for every time an employee had to go
sit and wait 15 minutes for the clerk to open the supply room, receive the
old gloves and approve and sign out a new pair, the company was losing the
equivalent in lost productivity to 20 pairs of gloves!  Their policy,
designed to ensure the company didn't lose money, was actually costing the
company more money than if they'd just set the gloves out for people to take
when they needed them!

Now, I may have some of the details a little off (I can't recall the exact
numbers), but you get the general point.  The thing is, though, this
tendency to enact these "policies" in order to ensure our
organizations don't "lose" money, quite often end up costing us
more in the long-run.  And the irony is (according to Getz and Carney)
that, really, only about 3% of the general population is going to take
advantage of the system anyways.  So, basically, we enact a rule in
order to keep the 3% in line, and in doing so, crush the productivity of the
other 97% who are actually working hard, trying to accomplish something
productive.

And, before you disregard this, know that I see this "3%"
mentality quite often--even in our affiliate companies (organizations that
are supposed to be amongst the most self-managed in the world).  The
truth is, we grow up in a world that is designed to thwart that lowest common
denominator--that 3%.  So many of our government's stifling regulations
are designed to ensure that small minority of the population doesn't get away
with doing something wrong.  Problem is, those regulations are, many
times, exactly that: stifling--not just to the 3%, but to
everyone.

Don't get me wrong: every society must have some general codes of
conduct.  But, as our organizations age, and as we become more
"professional", we think that success depends on us having a whole
volume of "does" and "don'ts".  Self-Management,
though, is designed to be a principle-based organizational model (not one
governed by a bunch of complex rules).  The two fundamental principles
are you don't use force and you do what you say you're going to do. 
Think about it: doesn't that cover just about everything?  You don't use
force--not to get someone to do something you want them to do, NOR to get
something that you want (that's called stealing).  And you do what you
say you'll do.  Isn't that kinda the recipe for a productive
society?

And here's the beauty of an organization like a business: you have a choice
as to who is a part of the organization.  If someone refuses to adhere
to those basic principles, then they just don't get to be a part of your
organization any more.  Let's go back to our initial example with the
gloves.  The owner in the story realized that he was losing quite a bit
of money every time someone had to come go through the "new glove"
process.  So instead he decided that anyone who needed gloves could
simply grab a pair of gloves as needed.  The unstated (perhaps) rule,
though, was that you can't steal gloves.  This change in process freed
up the 97% who were honest and hard-working to accomplish even more.  If
also, of course, freed up the 3% (who were inclined to steal) to take gloves
home (and perhaps sell them on the black market; who knows).  The thing
is, even if those 3% stole a lot of gloves, the additional productivity by
the 97% more than made up for the losses.  Further, someone is bound to
find out about the 3% at some point; some guy walking buy might see another
worker stuffing a handful of gloves in his pocket.  And he, then,
realizing that this shady glove-thief is not abiding by the first principle
(you don't steal), can simply go through whatever process exists to
disassociate with the thief.

So, I ask you this: what kind of organization do you want to be a part
of?  One that has books of rules and regulations, processes for ensuring
the 3% can't take too many pairs of gloves?  Or one that acknowledges
that 97% of the people within the organization aren't going to steal gloves,
and are simply being tied down by the opprossive regulations, and works to
eliminate the 3% instead?

That's a real question.  Comment below; I'm interested in your
thoughts.

The Problem:

In a recent meeting with a group of colleagues from one of the
Self-Managed firms we work with, one of the participants expressed some
frustration with a project they were working on.  It involved a sizable
investment—not an extraordinary amount of money, but enough to pay a person’s
salary for the year.  On the surface, the idea this colleague had was a
good one; it was going to reduce costs significantly (and add a measure of
safety to the facility to boot), but it seemed that the amount was in this
no-man’s land. 

Many things hamper the success of news work as a collective
enterprise. Temperamentally, journalists tend to be individualistic,
continually struggling to gain creative and professional autonomy. Their
editors may be technically skillful in news processing, but seldom are
formally educated in management skills—believing, anyway, that the managing
of journalists is somehow "unique." In turn, they work for
publishers who are primarily business-oriented, but who must balance the
public interest against the need to make a profit. Tensions abound in news
organizations.
Not surprisingly, problems of morale, turnover and attrition plague
journalism and, as Jobnstone, Slawaski and Bowman have pointed out in their
recent sociological study of American journalists, many young journalists
se-
riously doubt they wilt remain in the field. The "reporter power"
movement is one symptom of tbis dissatisfaction, and one the sociologists
suggest may grow in scope.
Now comes Theodore Caplow, Commonwealth professor of sociology at the
University of Virginia, witb a small handbook on how to run any
organization—including the newspaper. Not surprisingly, Caplow fails to deal
with goal conflict, which is probably the crux of the problem in journalism.
And yet Caplow's book is an admirable one tbat could be profitably read by
anyone who must manage any part of what Chris Argyris called "the living
system" of a newspaper.
The value of Caplow's book is that it takes a great deal of what
sociologists and other organizational scientists have learned through careful
study, and digests it into a compact, readable set of how-to-do-it
instructions for
neophyte managers. To a reader who might be mystified by the scbolarly
esoterica of
academicians, on the one hand, or disappointed on the other by thin gruel
from veteran managers who ignore research and theory, this should prove a
rewarding little book.
Caplow is nothing if not practical; his forthrightness sometimes has the
flavor of Machiavellian pragmatism. "Opinions differ about whether it is
better for a manager to be loved or feared by his subordinates," writes
Caplow, "but to be loved AND feared is best of all." He then goes
on to explain how a manager can best establish his authority – from assuming
office to dealing with subordinate managers. In each case Caplow specifies
techniques for success, often citing research foundations for his advice and
sometimes relating personal experiences or historic examples. Other subjects
dealt with by the author include communication, productivity, morale and
change. Newspaper managers should pay special attention to Caplow's advice on
communication—often, a sadly lacking commodity in news organizations, as any
journalist who has ever been shocked by a unilateral management decision can
testify.
Caplow's book could help reduce much of the managerial ineptitude troubling
newspapers. It should not be expected to resolve the core problem of goal
conflict.

JAMES H. BISSLAND
Bowling Green State University

Harvard Business School professor, Clayton Christensen, is
credited with coining the term "Disruptive Innovation".  It's
an innovation that is originally birthed at the bottom of the market, usually
as a substandard product, but moves rapidly up-market, eventually overtaking
and obliterating the established competitors. 

Think of it this way: a manufacturer of camera film finds out
about a competitor who has a new digital photo development process (requiring
no film, just some sort of digital media).  This large film manufacturer
investigates the new technology, but finds it an absurd investment: the
equipment to manufactur is extraordinarily expensive; the digital cameras are
outrageously priced; and the photo quality is laughable.  All in all, a
distinct step down from the relatively high picture quality and reasonable
price of their current film products.  And, frankly, it makes no sense
to spend a great deal of money to invest in a product that's a step down in
every way from your current product, right?

You tell me; should our hypothetical film manufacturer have made a
complete strategy shift, and embraced this new digital technology, even
though it was substandard?  In hindsight the answer is painfully
obvious; and if our hypothetical manufacturer failed to embrace digital
photography, he's likely out of business today.  Think of disruptive
innovation as something that seems substandard in every way, but comes from
nowhere and, over time, takes over the staid, tried and true methods and
products, turning entire industries on their proverbial ears.

Now consider with me, for a moment, a management innovation--like
Self-Management.  It's a revolutionary way of organizing that can bring
enormous benefit to the organization that embraces it.  But imagine a
large organization, with detailed organization charts, chains of command and
reporting structures.  To a leader in that organization, moving to a
structure with no hierarchy, no rigid chains of command and fluid job
descriptions, must feel like taking something that is neat and organized and
making it messy, murky and difficult to manage. To that leader,
embracing Self-Management isn't a sound strategic course of
action. 

But place this organizationl tool in the hands of an
entrepreneurial firm, an innovative company eager to embrace any meaningful
competitive advantage and they'll trade rigid chains of command, multi-page
organizational charts, multiple layers of management, and bureaucracy for
something difficult to describe in a picture, with a complex network of
bidirectional reporting relationships, but which makes for a lean group of
colleagues who can execute in a blink of an eye.  And our
entrepreneurial firm will overtake the professionally managed organization,
all else held equal, by the strength, flexibility and power of their
organizational model.

That's disruptive management innovation.

On June 9, 2005, Chris Rufer, founder of The Morning Star Company
and of the Self-Management Institute, was a guest on the nationally
syndicated Harry Browne Radio Program. Guest host, Jim Babka, interviewed Mr.
Rufer about Morning Star and its unique organizational style. The Morning
Star Self-Management Institute has made the audio recording of Mr. Rufer's
interview available for download from their site.

Harry
Browne, who passed away in 2006, was a renowned libertarian author,
politician and speaker. He was the Libertarian nominee for the US Presidency
in 1996 and 2000. He was the author of 19 books, including one New York Times
#1 best seller.

The interview is broken into three parts to make downloads
faster.

Download
Part 1

Download
Part 2

Download
Part 3

Amazon.com Review:

Now that he's gotten us talking about the viral life of ideas and
the power of gut reactions, Malcolm Gladwell poses a more provocative
question in Outliers: why do some people succeed, living remarkably
productive and impactful lives, while so many more never reach their
potential? Challenging our cherished belief of the "self-made man,"
he makes the democratic assertion that superstars don't arise out of nowhere,
propelled by genius and talent: "they are invariably the beneficiaries
of hidden advantages and extraordinary opportunities and cultural legacies
that allow them to learn and work hard and make sense of the world in ways others
cannot." Examining the lives of outliers from Mozart to Bill Gates, he
builds a convincing case for how successful people rise on a tide of
advantages, "some deserved, some not, some earned, some just plain
lucky."

Outliers can be enjoyed for its bits of trivia, like why most pro
hockey players were born in January, how many hours of practice it takes to
master a skill, why the descendents of Jewish immigrant garment workers
became the most powerful lawyers in New York, how a pilots' culture impacts
their crash record, how a centuries-old culture of rice farming helps Asian
kids master math. But there's more to it than that. Throughout all of these
examples--and in more that delve into the social benefits of lighter skin
color, and the reasons for school achievement gaps--Gladwell invites
conversations about the complex ways privilege manifests in our culture. He
leaves us pondering the gifts of our own history, and how the world could
benefit if more of our kids were granted the opportunities to fulfill their
remarkable potential. --Mari Malcolm

From Publishers Weekly:

In Outliers, Gladwell (The Tipping Point) once again proves
masterful in a genre he essentially pioneered—the book that illuminates
secret patterns behind everyday phenomena. His gift for spotting an
intriguing mystery, luring the reader in, then gradually revealing his
lessons in lucid prose, is on vivid display. Outliers begins with a
provocative look at why certain five-year-old boys enjoy an advantage in ice
hockey, and how these advantages accumulate over time. We learn what Bill
Gates, the Beatles and Mozart had in common: along with talent and ambition,
each enjoyed an unusual opportunity to intensively cultivate a skill that
allowed them to rise above their peers. A detailed investigation of the
unique culture and skills of Eastern European Jewish immigrants persuasively
explains their rise in 20th-century New York, first in the garment trade and
then in the legal profession. Through case studies ranging from Canadian
junior hockey champions to the robber barons of the Gilded Age, from Asian
math whizzes to software entrepreneurs to the rise of his own family in
Jamaica, Gladwell tears down the myth of individual merit to explore how
culture, circumstance, timing, birth and luck account for success—and how
historical legacies can hold others back despite ample individual gifts. Even
as we know how many of these stories end, Gladwell restores the suspense and
serendipity to these narratives that make them fresh and surprising.One
hazard of this genre is glibness. In seeking to understand why Asian children
score higher on math tests, Gladwell explores the persistence and painstaking
labor required to cultivate rice as it has been done in East Asia for
thousands of years; though fascinating in its details, the study does not
prove that a rice-growing heritage explains math prowess, as Gladwell
asserts. Another pitfall is the urge to state the obvious: No one, Gladwell
concludes in a chapter comparing a high-IQ failure named Chris Langan with
the brilliantly successful J. Robert Oppenheimer, not rock stars, not
professional athletes, not software billionaires and not even geniuses—ever
makes it alone. But who in this day and age believes that a high intelligence
quotient in itself promises success? In structuring his book against that
assumption, Gladwell has set up a decidedly flimsy straw man. In the end it
is the seemingly airtight nature of Gladwell's arguments that works against
him. His conclusions are built almost exclusively on the findings of
others—sociologists, psychologists, economists, historians—yet he rarely
delves into the methodology behind those studies. And he is free to
cherry-pick those cases that best illustrate his points; one is always left
wondering about the data he evaluated and rejected because it did not support
his argument, or perhaps contradicted it altogether. Real life is seldom as
neat as it appears in a Malcolm Gladwell book.